Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

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Edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup

Blackwell Publishers

Due/Published February 2005, 360 pages, paper

ISBN 1405107391

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features original essays on some of the most hotly debated issues in the field. Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief?Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. This distinctive format offers readers a unique opportunity to observe philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. The essays are centered around three core areas of epistemology: skepticism, the foundations of knowledge, and justification. Topics in debate include epistemic closure, contextualism, inference to the best explanation, a priori knowledge, regress problems, coherence theories, perception and conceptual content, internalism and externalism, epistemic goals, and epistemic justification as responsibility.

Series:Contemporary Debates in Philosophy

Contents

Notes on Contributors
Preface
Part I: Knowledge and Skepticism
Introduction, Matthias Steup (St. Cloud State University)
1. Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment?
The Case against Closure, Fred Dretske (Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin)
The Case for Closure, John Hawthorne (Rutgers University)
Reply to Hawthorne, Fred Dretske (Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin)
2. Is Knowledge Contextual?
Contextualism Contested, Earl Conee (University of Rochester)
Contextualism Defended, Stewart Cohen (Arizona State University)
Contextualism Contested Some More, Earl Conee (University of Rochester)Contextualism Defended Some More, Stewart Cohen (Arizona State University)
3. Can Skepticism Be Refuted?
The Refutation of Skepticism, Jonathan Vogel (Amherst College)
The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism, Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)
4. Is There A Priori Knowledge?
In Defense of the a Priori, Laurence BonJour (University of Washington)
There Is no a Priori, Michael Devitt (City University of New York)
Reply to Devitt, Laurence BonJour (University of Washington)
Reply to BonJour, Michael Devitt (City University of New York)
Last Rejoinder, Laurence BonJour (University of Washington)
References
Part II: Foundational Knowledge
Introduction, Matthias Steup (St. Cloud State University)
5. Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?
Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem, Peter Klein (Rutgers University)Infinitism Is not the Solution to the Regress Problem, Carl Ginet (Cornell University)
Reply to Ginet, Peter Klein (Rutgers University)
Reply to Klein, Carl Ginet (Cornell University)
6. Can Beliefs Be Justified through Coherence Alone?
Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability, Catherine Z. Elgin (Harvard Graduate School of Education)
Why Coherence Is not Enough: In Defense of Moderate Foundationalism, James van Cleve (Brown University)
7. Is There Immediate Justification?
There Is Immediate Justification, James Pryor (Princeton University)
Doing Without Immediate Justification, Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University)
8. Does Perceptual Experience Have Conceptual Content?
Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content, Bill Brewer (Oxford University)Perception and Conceptual Content, Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Part III: Justification
Introduction, Matthias Steup (St. Cloud State University)
9. Is Justification Internal?
Justification Is not Internal, John Greco (Fordham University)
Justification Is Internal, Richard Feldman (University of Rochester)
10. Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal?
Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal, Jonathan Kvanvig (University of Missouri)
Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis, Marian David (University of Notre Dame)
11. Is Justified Belief Responsible Belief?
Justified Belief as Responsible Belief, Richard Foley (New York University)
Obligation, Entitlement, and Rationality, Nicholas Wolterstorff (Yale University)Response to Wolterstorff, Richard Foley (New York University)
Response to Foley, Nicholas Wolterstorff (Yale University)
Index