Hilary Putnam

Realism, Reason and the Uses of Uncertainty

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by Christopher Norris

Manchester University Press

Due/Published June 2002, 304 pages, paper

ISBN 0719061962

n this study, Norris defends the kinds of arguments advanced by the early realist, Hilary Putnam. Norris makes a point of placing Putnam's work in a wider philosophical context, and relating it to various current debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. Much like Putnam, Norris is willing to take full account of opposed viewpoints while maintaining a vigorously argued commitment to the values of debate and enquiry.

Contents:

Introduction
Realism, Scepticism, and Naturalism: Stages on the Putnam Road
Objectivity, Reference, and Truth: The Problem with Quantum Mechanics
Squaring with Wittgenstein: Versions of 'Realism' in Putnam's Later Philosophy
Can Realism be Naturalized?: Putnam on Sense, Commonsense, and the Senses
How Many Positrons Make Five?: Science, Scepticism, and the 'Ready-Made World'
The 'Many Faces' of Realism: Reference, Meaning, and Theory Change
Is Logic Revisable?: Putnam, Quine, and 'Contextual Apriority'
The Platonist Fix: Why 'Nothing Works' (According to Putnam) in Philosophy of Mathematics
Putnam, Peano, and the 'Malin Genie': Could We Possibly Be Wrong About Elementary Number Theory?