Truth and Progress

Philosophical Papers: Volume 3

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by Richard Rorty

Cambridge University Press

Due/Published April 1998, 368 pages, paper

ISBN 0521556864

A new volume of Rorty's essays in which he continues to defend a pragmatist view of truth and deny that truth is a goal of inquiry. Along the way, he engages with the work of philosophers including Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jacques Derrida, JŸrgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, and Charles Taylor. The collection also comments on feminist issues raised by Annette Baier, Marilyn Frye, and Catherine MacKinnon.

Contents

Introduction; I; TRUTH AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS; 1; Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?: Donald Davidson vs. Crispin Wright; 2; Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace; 3; John Searle on Realism and Relativism; 4; Charles Taylor on Truth; 5; Daniel Dennett on Intrinsicality; 6; Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations; 7; The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism; 8; Anti-Sceptical Weapons: Michael Williams vs. Donald Davidson; II: MORAL PROGRESS: TOWARDS MORE INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES; 9; Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality; 10; Rationality and Cultural Difference; 11; Feminism and Pragmatism; 12; The End of Leninism, Havel and Social Hope; III: THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN PROGRESS; 13; The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres; 14; The Contingency of Philosophical Problems: Michael Ayers on Locke; 15; Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin; 16; Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy; 17; Derrida and the Philosophical Tradition.

Review

Can we do without such notions as "the intrinsic nature of reality" or that "truth is a correspondence to reality?" Well, if you were to ask Richard Rorty, he would probably say, "yes." Furthermore, Rorty argues that it is not necessary to attempt to specify the nature of truth. Instead philosophy should engage in solving problems, and finding new ways to discuss issues. Rorty resists the temptation for philosophy to become more rigorous or "scientific." Instead, he calls on philosophy to be more imaginative. He joins this with his notion of philosophical "progress," a process which imaginatively integrates past philosophy with more recent developments in the field and in the society, in the hopes of making men's minds more sensitive to the life about them." Needless to say, Rorty's pragmatism and relativism are certainly on display in this newest collection of essays that Charles Taylor has called "Rorty at his best," he continues, "[Rorty makes] us see things from a new, unexpected angle, strenuously engaging with those of us who resist his startling and unsettling "take" on things. Convinced or not, you come away feeling that this is what philosophy ought to be doing, steadily extending the range of imaginable thoughts." Rorty articulates his argument in a series of essays discussing the work of some of the most prominent contemporary philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, and John Searle, and others.