Search for 

 in 

 
       

 

 

The Book of Evidence


 
Browse
Return to Previous Page
   
  Related Subjects
All Subjects
History & Philosophy of Science
Science

Oxford University Press

Due/Published January 2004, 304 pages, paper

ISBN 0195171713

New in paper (S04)

What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori.

Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided to the "grue," "ravens," "lottery," and "old-evidence" paradoxes, and to a series of questions. These include whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight, whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support, what counts as a scientific discovery, and what sort of evidence is required for it. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules, what type of evidence J. J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron, and whether, as is usually supposed, he really discovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers in terms of the concepts of evidence introduced.

 
 



 
 
About Frontlist
 
 

Web Site Designed by Affordable Web Design
Minneapolis Web Design